Metaphilosophy and free will / / Richard Double.
In this text, the author looks at the contending schools of thought on the problem of free will. He argues that the free will problem is intractable because free will theorists are separated by metaphilosophical differences in the way they view the philosophical enterprise itself.
Gespeichert in:
Elektronisch
E-Book
| Person | |
|---|---|
| Ort, Verlag, Jahr |
New York
: Oxford University Press
, 1996
|
| Umfang | 1 online resource (xi, 176 pages) |
| ISBN | 0-19-773086-8 1-280-45290-0 0-19-535541-5 1-4237-4093-9 |
| Sprache | Englisch |
| Zusatzinfo | Previously issued in print: 1996. |
| Zusatzinfo | Contents; 1 Introduction; 1. Free Will Subjectivism and Metaphilosophy; 2. An Example of the Importance of Metaphilosophy; 3. A Provisional Definition of Free Choice; 4. Overview of the Book; I: THE FREE WILL PROBLEM AS A PROBLEM IN METAPHILOSOPHY; 2 Metaphilosophies; 3 Intermediate-Level Philosophical Principles; 4 How the Free Will Debate Depends on Metaphilosophy (I); 5 How the Free Will Debate Depends on Metaphilosophy (II); II: FREE WILL FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF PHILOSOPHY AS CONTINUOUS WITH SCIENCE; 6 How to Frame the Free Will Problem; 7 The Fragmentation of Free Will 8 Free Will Is a Moral Concept; 9 Hume's Principle: The Subjectivity of Moral Responsibility and Free Will; 10 Conclusion; References; Index |
| Zusatzinfo | English |
| Serie/Reihe | Oxford scholarship online. |
| Online-Zugang | EBSCO EBS 2024 https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780195107623.001.0001 |
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